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Notes
Initiative Funding Through Targeted Taxes:
Proposition 63, Mental Health, and the
Crossroads of Direct Democracy
ANDREW

M.

HOLMES*

It is to be hoped that within a few years the combination of increased
mental health insurance coverage, added state and local support and
the redirection of state resources from state mental institutions will
help achieve our goal of having community centered mental health
service readily accessible to all.
-President John F. Kennedy'
INTRODUCTION

It took over forty-one years, but on November 2, 2004, President
John F. Kennedy's vision of localized mental health care became a reality
in California through the ratification of Proposition 63.' Also known as
California's Mental Health Services Act, Proposition 63 (the
Proposition) was criticized as another "outrageous special interest
initiative," having little or no oversight, and branded as a way for mental
health stakeholders to fill their pockets by raising taxes.3 However, the
proponents of "one of the more controversial of the 2004 ballot
propositions" sought to bring relief to California's mental health system

* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2008; B.A. Molecular
& Cell Biology, University of California, Berkeley, 2004. I would like to express my gratitude to my
wife Annie, my parents, my brother and sister, and the Holmes, Strack, and Beasley families.
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I. JOHN F. KENNEDY, MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S. RELATIVE TO MENTAL ILLNESS AND
MENTAL RETARDATION,
2. CALIFORNIA

H.R. Doc. No. 88-58, at 6 (1963).
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OF STATE,

STATEMENT
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THE

VOTE

45

(2004),

available at

http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/sov/2oo4_general/sov_2oo4_entire.pdf.
3. Lewis K. Uhler, An Opposing View: Prop. 63 A mental health initiative dangerous for

California, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 12, 2004, at Bsi. "Mental health stakeholders" is a term used by
Proposition 63 and those familiar with the Proposition to refer to individuals and entities who have an
interest in the mental health industry.
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after decades of broken promises.' Supporters eagerly asserted that the
Proposition would provide funding and necessary support to California's
largely underfunded, crippled mental health system.' From 1957 to 1988,
California's health system reduced its hospital population by 84%,6 and
today that system must aid the estimated two million Californians who
suffer from mental illness.7
The controversy surrounding Proposition 63 is not whether
treatment for the mentally ill is a priority of the State, but whether the
funding structure of the proposition is abusive. The Proposition is unique
because it funds mental health service expansion in California by
targeting a narrow segment of the population with a special tax whose
funds are earmarked for new mental health programs throughout the
state." The Proposition imposes a flat tax of i % on every dollar over one
million dollars earned by individual taxpayers in California. 9 These
higher earning citizens represent approximately o.o69-o.o83%1' of the
population in California and provide 25% of the annual personal income
tax revenue for the state." Prior to the passage of the Proposition many
opponents argued that it was "an abuse of California's direct-democracy
process" and that it would create a tax structure, which, quoting Winston
Churchill, is "a mystery, inside a riddle, wrapped in an enigma." 2
The targeted tax is seen as a necessary evil by the drafters of the
legislation to fulfill a forty-year-old hole left in California's health care

4. Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, Proposition 63: Mental Health
Services Funding (Dec. 2004), http://igs.berkeley.edu/library/htProp63MentalHealthServices
Expansion.htm; see also Victoria Colliver, Patients' Rights vs. Public Safety, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 22, 2007,
at AI (discussing the state of involuntary care in the United States and the possible benefits of
Proposition 63); Uhler, supra note 3.
5. The Center for Mental Health Services Research, History of Public Mental Health in
California and the U.S., (Mar. 21, 2007) [hereinafter History of Public Mental Health] (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Hastings Law Journal).
6. Id.
7. Mental Health Services Act, 2004 Cal. Legis. Serv. page no. A-46 § 2(a) (West).
8. See id. at A-47 § 2(g).
9. Id.; see also Colliver, supra note 4.
so. Uhler, supra note 3; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
2006 POPULATION ESTIMATES,
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/GCTTable?-bm=y&-geo-id=oioooUS&-_boxheadnbr=GCT-TiS
R&-ds name=PEP2oo6_EST&-format=US-9 (last visited Oct. 31, 2007) (reporting 25,000-30,000
out of a total of 36.1 million residents); see also CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER
INFORMATION GUIDE: PROPOSITION 63: MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES EXPANSION, FUNDING. TAX ON
PERSONAL INCOMES ABOVE $I MILLION. INITIATIVE STATUTE. 32-35 (2004) (analysis by the legislative
analyst), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/bp-novo4/prop-63-entire.pdf. More recent data
shows that the number of individuals affected by the Proposition was closer to 30,000 in the first year.
See Anna Meyer, CheckUp on Proposition 63, (June 5, 2007), http://www.healthvote.org/index.php/
checkup/C26/.
i i. Uhler, supra note 3 (noting that $8 billion of the $32 billion raised each year in state income
tax revenue is from the "million dollar earners" in California).
12.

Id.
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system when the state mental health facilities were closed in the I960s. I3
The dichotomy is apparent: California targeted a very small, wealthy
group of taxpayers to support programs for a politically disenfranchised,
underfunded mental health system. The issue is whether targeting taxes
at extremely small portions of the population to fund initiatives and
earmarking those funds is abusive of the direct democratic process. As of
late 2007, no other California statute raises revenue through a targeted
tax platform.
So is this an abuse of the initiative process and our direct democratic
form of government in California? Or is it simply an overdue victory for
an often-ignored group who battled for funding for over forty years?
In answering these questions, this Note will first trace the roots of
the controversy through a historical analysis of California's mental health
system. Part I establishes that California's mental health system struggled
for support for forty years and is in need of the funds that Proposition 63
provides.
Part II discusses the Proposition's rationale, its goals of mental
health expansion and prevention, and the impact of its implementation.
Here, the Note will introduce how the Proposition funds itself-by
raising income taxes-and who has been tapped for that funding:
individuals with income over one million dollars.
Part III of the Note engages in a discussion of the direct democratic
process and its pitfalls. It concludes by asserting not only that Proposition
63 is susceptible to the abuses of the direct democratic process, but also
that direct democracy is not the best vehicle for enacting and imposing
new taxes.
The note then presents a brief tax policy discussion focusing on the
tax problems and tax policy issues raised by Proposition 63. The premise
of Part IV is to present, at a very basic level, that fairness and the
promotion of economic prosperity are historical benchmarks for gauging
taxes. In light of those benchmarks, an analysis of Proposition 63 shows
both a lack of correlation between Proposition 63 and those policy
benchmarks and an inherent failure to adhere to the historical ideals of
tax policy.
The mental health, direct democracy, and tax issues will then come
full circle in Part V, which addresses the paradox of the Proposition: that
it is an initiative rooted in sound public policy but funded by a shortsighted tax scheme. Part V then discusses the future implications of
initiative funding through targeted taxes, and details how a subsequent
initiative proposing a targeted tax failed to garner the voters' approval.
13. See Colliver, supra note 4 (noting that the "closure of state hospitals" coincided with the 1967
Lanterman-Petris-Short Act).
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The point of Part V is to establish-considering the pitfalls of the direct
democratic process-that using direct democracy to raise taxes on a
fraction of the population lacks common sense ideals of fairness, fails to
reflect sound tax policy, and fails to address the long term economic
implications that such a tax structure creates.
Part VI proposes possible changes to the Proposition including a
complete repeal, amending the current tax structure, and spreading the
tax over a large segment of the tax-paying population. Part VI asserts
that the latter would be fair and financially viable, but would ultimately
fail considering the liklihood of raising taxes across all personal income
tax brackets at the ballot box. Accordingly, an amendment is viable
through the California legislature, but that inherently persents a myriad
of further political obstacles.
Following these proposals is a concluding section, reiterating not
only the implications and abuses of the tax platform, but comments on
the need to find a common ground to provide a fair and economically
responsible solution to Proposition 63's funding apparatus.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN CALIFORNIA

A. ORIGINS
In order to correctly frame how Proposition 63 came to be, a
historical examination of California's mental health system is critical.
Throughout California's 159 years of statehood, the state government as
an entity consistently played a significant role in providing medical care
for its mentally ill citizens. 4 The first state run hospital in Stockton,
California was set aside by legislative enactment for the insane in 1853.
At that point in time, the state footed the bill if a mental patient's family
was unable to pay for care.'5 The initial goal of the state was not to
relieve the counties of their responsibility for the poor and the sick, but
to provide better facilities for the insane. 6 Thus, the early state facilities
were primarily holding facilities for the "insane" and "poor."' 7
Despite California's active role in providing medical care for its
citizens, as modern medicine and our understanding of the human brain
evolved, so did California's approach to treating the mentally ill. For
example, in the early 2oth century the State Board of Charities
considered the state-run mental hospitals places for detention of the
14. Caring for the mentally ill, though long considered a local government function, has been a
state function in California since 1851. MARGARET GREENFIELD, PROVIDING FOR MENTAL ILLNESS: AN
EXAMINATION OF RESOURCES AND METHODS OF PAYING FOR TREATMENT, WITH EXAMPLES FROM THE SAN

FRANCISCO BAY AREA, 15 (1964).

15. Id. at 16.
6. Id. at 15-16.
17. Id. at 16.
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chronically insane and not as facilities for treatment.' S However, with
medical advances and evolving attitudes toward the treatment of those
with mental illness, a state system developed by 1964 that had "ten
hospitals for the mentally ill ...

,

six hospitals for the mentally retarded,

and two neuropsychiatry institutes" run by California's Department of
Mental Hygiene. 9
As the state became more involved in the care and treatment of the
mentally ill, a movement against the state consolidation of the mentally
ill began to shape and gain momentum." The incentive for local
treatment was sparked by the National Mental Health Act of 1946, under
which federal grants were made to states for developing mental health
programs.2" The act stimulated the state to authorize state mental health
agencies and to develop or promote the development of locally
administered community mental health services, in contrast to the central
state-run facilities.2 California further advanced mental health care with
the passage of the 1957 Short-Doyle Act, which replaced the large, state
institutions with county-operated, local mental health systems. 3 Further
impetus to provide community level health services was the 1963
Kennedy legislation, which set up federal grants for construction
of
24
community mental health centers to furnish a "continuum of care.
B.

EMPTY PROMISES AND THE RISE OF PROPOSITION

63

By the beginning of the i96os, mental health reformers sought to
take the mentally ill out of large institutions and house them in smaller,
community-based residences where they could live more productive and
fulfilling lives.25 Although the state established a significant statewide
treatment program, by the mid i96os the trend began to shift toward
providing service' 6 in the local community rather than at "some distant
mental hospital. 2
In 1968 California Governor Ronald Reagan signed the LantermanPetris-Short Act ("LPS Act") which quickly became a national model for
mental health reform. 7 Among other things, the LPS Act was an attempt
by the state to replace large state facilities with local, county run mental
I8. Id. (noting that in 19o6 this was the Agency's position on the function of mental health
facilities in California).
19. Id. at I.
20. History of Public Mental Health, supra note 5.
21. GREENFIELD, supra note 14.
22. Id.
23.

PHIL

BROWN,

THE

TRANSFER

OF

CARE:

PSYCHIATRic

AFTERMATH 84 (New York: Routledge 1988) (1985).
24. GREENFIELD, supra note 54, at 17.
25. History of Public Mental Health, supra note 5.
26. GREENFIELD, supra note 14.
27. History of Public Mental Health, supra note 5.
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health facilities." As "a product of the civil rights movement," 9 the LPS
Act represented "the State's effort to strike an appropriate balance
between treatment needs, individual rights, and public safety. '""
Additionally, the LPS Act authorized involuntary evaluation and

treatment for patients who were dangerous to others and themselves,
and it "provided a legal basis for treating patients, as well as procedural

safeguards, to protect individuals from erroneous commitment."3

While the LPS Act and the social shift favoring smaller, community-

based programs were created with good intentions, the combined effects
were dire. The LPS Act effectively emptied out the State's mental
hospitals.3" Additionally, Reagan cut state hospital jobs and several state
operated after-care facilities, sending many mentally ill individuals out

on the streets.33 The local counties and communities that were supposed
to assist the patients formerly in the state-run facilities, failed to have the
infrastructure, resources or ability to handle the patients.34 It is well
documented that the promise to fund the local mental health centers,

which were to replace the state run institutions, was never fulfilled.35 For
the next thirty years, according to the mental health community, the state
legislators

did

not provide

enough

money

for

community-based

programs to provide treatment and shelter.36The next two decades were
marked with increased homelessness rates and decreased amounts of
state and federal funding, resulting in the failure to provide adequate

28. Id.
29. Colliver, supra note 4.
3o. History of Public Mental Health, supra note 5.
31. Id.
32. History of Public Mental Health, supra note 5; see Colliver, supra note 4 (noting that the LPS
Act "coincided with the closure of state hospitals").
33. 2004 Cal. Legis. Serv. page no. A-47 § 2(d); see Colliver, supra note 4 ("Later, funding and
support for community psychiatric services and board-and-care were severely curtailed, leaving many
mentally ill people with fewer places to go... . [M]any people with serious illnesses ended up on the

streets or in jail."); see also JAMES W. TRENT, INVENTING THE FEEBLE MIND: A HISTORY OF MENTAL
RETARDATION IN THE UNITED STATES 256 (1994). Trent wrote the following about Ronald Reagan:

In January 1967, Ronald W. Reagan ...ordered all state agencies to eliminate io percent of
what he characterized as "fat" from their budgets. More specifically, he insisted that state
hospitals and institutions for the retarded cut their budgets by $17 million. This cut, Reagan
insisted, would eliminate 3,700 state jobs, close fourteen state-operated outpatient clinics, and
begin a process of community-based care, with communities taking greater responsibility for the
guardianship of their "mental patients." Angered by reaction to his proposals, Reagan remarked
that state hospitals (and prisons) constituted the "biggest hotel chain in the state."
Id.
34. History of Public Mental Health, supra note 5.
35. See, e.g., LrITLE HOOVER COMMISSION, BEING THERE: MAKING A COMMITMENT TO MENTAL
HEALTH, at i, iv (2ooo) [hereinafter LITTLE HOOVER CoMissIoN], available at http://www.lhc.ca.gov/

lhcdir/t57/reports57.pdf; see also History of Public Mental Health, supra note 5.
36. See LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION, supra note 35, at 91; see also History of Public Mental
Health, supra note 5.
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resources and facilities to house the mentally ill.37
In 1999, thirty-two years after the LPS Act, the California State
Legislature funded pilot projects in Stanislaus, Los Angeles, and
Sacramento counties offering comprehensive treatment for the mentally
ill.38 Within the first four months, the ten million dollar pilot program
helped move one thousand people off the streets and into support
systems of care.39 Following closely behind, in September of 2000, the
state legislature approved Assembly Bill No. 2034 (AB 2034). AB 2034

sought to provide funds to allow the pilot projects to continue "successful
program expansions" into the 2000-2001 fiscal year. 4 ° Even though AB
2034 is hailed as "hands down the most effective program for bringing
people in off the streets" and "led to huge reductions in incarceration
and hospitalization," it was only utilized in three out of California's fiftyeight counties.4'
Despite the promising results from AB 2034 and the pilot programs,
in 2000 the Little Hoover Commission42 submitted a report with
recommendations to the Governor of California that the mentally ill in
California were in dire need of attention.43 From 2000 to 2004, the
lobbying and campaigning to fulfill the forty-year-old promise began to
gain momentum. Largely backed by Democratic Assemblyman Darrell
Steinberg, during the run-up to the 2004 elections, Proposition 63 was
pitched as a solution to fulfill a state promise that was made "more than

37. See Assem. B. 2034, 2000 Leg., 1999-2000 Sess. § I(a) (5) (Cal. 2ooo); see also History of
Public Mental Health, supra note 5.
38. LI-rLE HOOVER COMMISSION, supra note 35, at 70.
39. LITrLE HOOVER COMMISSION, supra note 35, at 62; see also Assem. B. 2034, 2000 Leg., 19992000 Sess. § I(a) (4).
o
4 . Assem. B. 2034, 2000 Leg., 1999-2000 Sess. § I(b) (I).
41. Steve Lopez, Governor, show a little carefor the mentally ill,
L.A. TIMES, June 29, 2007 at BI
(internal quotation marks omitted).
42. The Little Hoover Commission,
formally known as the Milton Marks "Little Hoover" Commission on California State
Government Organization and Economy, is an independent state oversight agency that was
created in 1962 .... [T]he Commission is a balanced bipartisan board composed of five
citizen members appointed by the Governor, four citizen members appointed by the
Legislature, two Senators and two Assembly members.
Little Hoover Commission, About the Commission, http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhcdir/about.html (last
visited Oct. 31, 2007). The Commission fulfills its charge by listening to the public, consulting with the
experts and conferring with the wise, in the course of its investigations. See id. The commission
typically empanels advisory committees, conducts public hearings, and visits government operations in
action. See id. The Hoover Commission was founded to provide recommendations to the Governor
and to assist in economic planning and other matters of public importance. See id. It is the November
20oo Report entitled "Being There: Making a Commitment to Mental Health" that is relevant to this
note. See generally LITrLE HOOVER COMMISSION, supra note 35.
43. See Letter from Richard R. Terzian, Chairman, Little Hoover Commission, to California
Governor Gray Davis and Members of the Legislature (Nov. 20, 2000) (introducing the Commission's
Report, LIrrLE HOOVER COMMISSION, supra note 35, and noting that the mentally ill in California were
in need of assistance).
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30 years ago, when [the state] closed down the state psychiatric

hospitals."" To the delight of mental health stakeholders, advocates, and
Proposition 63 supporters, the voters of California responded, approving
the initiative and laying the foundation of a plan envisioned over forty
years ago.45

II.
A.

FULFILLING

A PROMISE:

THE MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ACT

GOALS, POLICIES & STRUCTURE

"The consequences of not treating the mentally ill are obvious and
tragic: homelessness, drug addiction, domestic violence, crime, teenage
dropouts, pregnancies, child abuse and neglect. ' ,, 6 Proposition 63 has
lofty goals for what its backers view as a large problem: it "combine[s]
prevention services with a full range of integrated services to treat the
whole person" with the hope of promoting "self-sufficiency for those
who may have otherwise faced homelessness or dependence on the state
for years to come."47 The Proposition was enacted to "reduce the long
term adverse impact on individuals, families and state and local budgets
resulting from untreated serious mental illness." 8 Additionally, the
Proposition explicitly sought to expand "successful, innovative [mental
health] service programs for children, adults and seniors"49 and sought to
focus on education and prevention of mental illness in California."
The Proposition sought to utilize proven programs to promote
"client-centered, family focused and community-based services that are
culturally and linguistically competent and are provided in an integrated
services system."'" There are six main components to the integration of
Proposition 63: (i) local planning; (2) community services and support;
(3) workforce education and training; (4) capital facilities and
technological needs; (5) prevention and early intervention; and (6)
innovation." The point is both to use the community and locally based
structures developed in the i96os, and to "increase funding, personnel
and other resources to support county medical health programs and
monitor progress toward statewide goals for serving children, transition
age youth, adults, older adults and families with mental health needs."53

44. Joan Ryan, One woman takes sides on Prop. 63, S.F. CHRON,, Oct. 17, 2004, at BI.
45. See CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 2, at 37-54.
46. Ryan, supra note 44.
47. 2004 Cal. Legis. Serv. page no. A- 4 7 § 2(e) (West).
48. Id. at A-47 § 3 (b).
49. Id. at A-47 § 3(c).
50. See generally id. at A-5o to -51 §§ 4, 8.
51. Id. at A-47 § 3(c).
52. STEPHEN W.

MAYBERG,

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT

OF MENTAL

SERVICES ACT EXPENDITURE REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2006-2007 9-10 (2007).

53. Id. at 3.

HEALTH, MENTAL

HEALTH
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California legislative analysts have consistently noted that in the
long run all California taxpayers will save money from Proposition 63.4
According to the analysts and proponents, the savings will be "hundreds
of millions of dollars annually on a statewide basis, from reduced costs
from state prison and county jail operation and medical care, police
activities, shelter and social service programs for the homeless."55 While
these numbers are speculative, the Little Hoover Commission found that
California is spending billions of dollars dealing with the consequences of
untreated mental illness, rather than spending that money on adequate
services, treatment, and prevention. Additionally, the economic impact
of failing to adequately diagnose and deal with mental illness negatively

impacts every aspect of our economy, as it suffers from a loss of
productivity, increased costs of criminal justice, and an increased burden
on the public health facilities. 7

B.

FINANCING MENTAL ILLNESS: TARGETED TAXES & EARMARKING

"California's personal income tax was established in 1935 and is the
state's single largest revenue source." 8 In order to fund the initiative, the
drafters of Proposition 63 created two new sections, amended one
section, added them to California's Revenue and Taxation Code, and
placed them in sections 12, 13 and 14 of the Proposition. 9 The first,
Revenue and Taxation Code section 17043, is the primary mechanism for
the funding and received the majority of the criticism. It imposes, starting
as of January I, 2005, an additional tax at the rate of i % on the portion
of a taxpayer's taxable income in excess of one million dollars. 6 The
direct estimated impact of the tax to the average million-dollar earner is
a tax increase of about Io%.6' Additionally, the tax is "levied on both
residents and nonresidents."62 Nowhere does the Proposition account for
the time value of money or inflation, which like the Alternative
54. See CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note to; Richard A. Shadoan, Repairing Broken
Promises in California, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, Sept. 3, 2004, at 20. Note also that Rhode Island Senator

Kennedy's new Congressional legislation may have a national impact, which may have a 12:1dollar
saving ratio. See infra note 160 and acompanying text.
55. Shadoan, supra note 54; accord CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 10, at 35.
56. See LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION, supra note 35, at iii, 33.

57. Id. at iii.
58. CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 10, at 32.

59. Section 12 of the Mental Health Services Act created Revenue and Taxation Code section
17043, section 13 amended Revenue and Taxation Code section 19602, and section 14 created
Revenue and Taxation Code section 19602.5. 2004 Cal. Legis. Serv. page nos. A-54 to -57 §§ 12-14

(West).
6o. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17043(a) (West 2000); 2004 Cal. Legis. Serv. page no. A-54
§ 12(a).

61. Uhler, supra note 3; see also CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 10, at 33 (noting that,

in general, California personal income tax rates "range from I percent to 9.3 percent, depending on a
taxpayer's income level").
62. CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 10, at 33.
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Minimum 63Tax may pull more taxpayers into the targeted tax bracket in
the future.
Aside from other technicalities, the funds raised from Revenue and
Taxation Code section 17043 go directly from the State Controller into
the Mental Health Services Fund, which is controlled by the California

Department of Mental Health. " The funds are earmarked entirely for
new county mental health programs, 65 and are not subject to "change by
actions of the Legislature and Governor. 6 6 The funds raised from the
Proposition do not compete with the general fund of the state, and other

interest groups cannot lobby or compete for the funds raised.

6
The text of the Proposition dictates how the money will be spent, 8
and the Department of Mental Health (DMH) must allocate the funds
through contracts with California's fifty-eight counties." The funds can

be used by the counties for a number of programs: (i)children's systems
of care, (2) adult systems of care, (3) prevention and early intervention,
(3) "wraparound" services for families, (4)innovation programs, (5)
mental health workforce-education & training, and (6) capital facilities

and technology.' Each county seeking funding for new mental health
services must submit a three year plan with required expenditures plans,
resource allocation, estimated need and other data to the DMH, who

then must approve the request and allocate the funds.7'
Prior to the passage of the Proposition, the drafters and other state
63. Phil Kerpen, The Smart Way to Soak the Rich, WALL ST.J., July 30, 2007, at A12 ("[B]ecause
lawmakers conveniently forgot to index the AMT for inflation, it now hits an increasingly large
portion of upper middle income folks ...").
64. 2004 Cal. Legis. Serv. page no. A-56 to -59 § 15. The California Department of Mental Health
is the state agency tasked with oversight and implementation of the Proposition. The Proposition also
created an oversight committee, the Mental Health Services Oversight and Accountability
Commission, containing individuals appointed by the Governor of California. See 2004 Cal. Legis.
Serv. page nos. A-5i to -54 § IO;CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE., supra note 10, at 34.
65. See 2004 Cal. Legis. Serv. page no A-56 § 15 ("The funding established pursuant to this Act
shall be utilized to expand mental health services. These funds shall not be used to supplant existing
state or county funds utilized to provide mental health services.")
66. CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 10, at 33. Earmarking is a requirement that all or
a portion of a certain source of revenue (here a tax) must be devoted towards spending on a "specific
public expenditure." Earmarking bypasses the normal procedure where tax revenue is pooled in a
general fund, which is then distributed among separate spending programs. See Wikipedia,
Earmarking, http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Earmarking&oldid-15784665 t (last visited Oct.
31, 2007).

67. 2004 Cal. Legis. Serv. page nos. A-56 to -57 § i5 ("These funds shall only be used to pay for
the programs authorized in section 5892. These funds may not be used to pay for any other program.
These funds may not be loaned to the state General Fund or any other fund of the state, or a county
general fund or any other county fund for any purpose other than those authorized by Section 5892.")
68. See generally id. at A-56 to -59 § i5 (establishing the Mental Health Services Fund and
explaining in detail how the funds are to be allocated).
69. See CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 54, at 34.
70. Id.at 33.
71. Id.at34; see also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5847(a) (West 2000).
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officials estimated that Proposition 63 would raise approximately $254
million in 2004-05 (partial year), $683 million in 2005-2006, $690 million
in 2006-2007, and $733 million in the 2007-2008 fiscal year 7' from about
twenty-five to thirty thousand million-dollar-earners in California.73
Additionally, it was projected that this amount could reach about one
billion dollars in the years to follow. 4 While the numbers have varied in
terms of exactly how much has been raised, it is clear that that the initial
projections underestimated the number of million-dollar-earners in
California, 75 as the Department of Finance has seen the funds coming in
higher than original projections: the total tax revenues from the
Proposition were $253.8 million in 2004-2005, $1.3 billion in 2005-2006
and an estimated $1.5 billion in 2006-2007. Proposition 63 is projected
to raise between $1.7-1.8 billion in the 2007-2008 fiscal year alone.77
The "infusion of cash" has its downsides, however, as the funds
cannot be used on pre-Proposition
63 programs and must be used to
78
create new programs. In some counties this effectively reduces available
resources by cutting off old programs in order to adequately meet the
requirements of creating new mental health programs. 79 Thus, "[m]ental
health programs that existed before 2004 can't share in the bounty, and
have seen funding levels stagnate and in some cases cut." ' The result is
that Proposition 63 has created a "two-tiered mental health system that
rewards new programs while neglecting the pre-Prop. 63 mental health
programs."'"
There are other ambiguities and problems With implementation of
the Proposition. For example, it is not clear who the funds from
Proposition 63 can be used to pay. Recent litigation involving this issue

72. See 2004 Cal. Legis. Serv. page nos. A-55 to -56 § 14; cf CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE,

supra note 54, at 32 (citing similar estimates).
73. Bilen Mesfin, Prop 63 Would Expand Mental Health Service, Tax the Rich, NCTIMES.COM,
Sept. i8, 2004, http://www.nctimes.comlartiCles/2004/9/19/electin2oo4/state/19-04-459-i8-4.txt.

74. Greg Kane, Millionare Tax to Go Toward Mental Health Programs, STOCKTON RECORD, Jan.
18, 2007, http://www.recordnet.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070li8/A-NEWS/7Oli8O3t9/-'?A_NEWSs 3.
75. Id. (noting that the state under-estimated their number of wealthy residents and "raked in
$93o million for 2006-07 and expects to generate more than $i billion next year").
76. See Meyer, supra note 10.
77. Judy Lin, A Place to Call Home. State's Prop. 63 Funds Help Get Mentally Ill Off the Streets,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 25, 2007, at A3 (projecting revenues of $1.8 billion); see also Meyer, supra note
10 (projecting revenues of $1.7 billion in 2007-2008).
78. Meyer, supra note 10; see also John Cote, New Funds Lease Old ProgramsStruggling Despite
Prop. 63: Counties Cut Core Mental Health Aid, S.F. CHRONICLE, July 31, 2006, at Bi; Opinion Staff,
Don't backslide on mental health funding, NCTIMES.COM, May 31, 2007, http://www.nctimes.com/
articles/2oo7/o6/oi/oPINION/editorials20_o0275_3 I07.prt.

79.
so.
County
81.

Cote, supra note 78.
Opinion Staff, supra note 78. The article also notes that 40,000 plus patients in San Diego
alone depend on pre-Proposition 63 programs. Id.
Id.
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in Monterey County produced an Attorney General Opinion holding
that the funds cannot be used for county court workers dealing with the
mentally ill. 2 Additionally, there are two problems with the
implementation of the proposition: inadequate infrastructure to deal
with over one billion dollars in funds and inadequate ability to allocate
the funds efficiently."s A report from the Center for Government Studies
commented on these two significant problems:
The rapid influx of tax revenues has presented DMH with two
dilemmas. First, a management infrastructure for spending this huge
increase in funds did not exist and had to be built quickly. And second,
new Prop. 63 funding must be used to create and expand new programs
only, so many existing county mental health programs are still facing
budget cuts.
Thus, the opponents of Proposition 63 may have been correct in arguing
that the Proposition was "well-intended but short-sighted 85 as it has
created significant problems in the three years since its enactment.
On the other hand, the state finally has the funding to provide
adequate services for mental health care, which was absent for the past
forty years. 86 The California Department of Mental Health reports that
Proposition 63 spending was $168 million in 2004-2005, $518 million in
2005-2006 and projections for 2007-2008 are about $1.5 billion.8

Regardless of the inefficiency and inability to disperse all available funds,
to a mental health stakeholder these problems may simply be necessary
short term transaction costs to reach the bigger goal of providing mental
health services to Californians without the financial means to obtain
proper care. Additionally, the short term costs of the program may be
outweighed by the long term savings from reduced prison and jail
operations, medical care, homeless shelters and other social service
programs.&8 Conversely, in terms of economics, efficiency and tax policy,
every tax dollar wasted through inefficiency and inability to implement is
counterproductive and abusive
to the taxpayers who have been targeted
9
to fund the Proposition.

82. See 89 Op. Att'y Gen. Cal. 20 (2006).

83. Meyer, supra note 10.
84. Id.

85. CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, supra note 58 at 37.
86. See Colliver, supra note 4.
87. Meyer, supra note 10; see also STEPHEN
HEALTH

SERVICES

ACT

EXPENDITURE

MAYBERG, CAL. DEP'T OF MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL

REPORT FISCAL

YEAR

2006-2007

I8 (2007), available at

http://www.dmh.cahwnet.gov/MHSA/docs/MHSALegRptJano7-Final-o2-15-o7.pdf.
88. See Shadoan, supra note 54; CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 54, at 35.
89. See infra Part IV (discussing the relevant tax policy implications of the system set up through
Proposition 63).
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So how and why did the voters of California approve a potentially
abusive proposition? The answer is dealt with appropriately through the
dynamics and lens of California's initiative process.
III.
A.

DIRECT DEMOCRACY

THE RISE OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES AND
CALIFORNIA

Modern legal scholars have categorized California's current
governmental apparatus as a Hybrid Democracy,' and the focus of this
section will be on the initiative or direct democratic arm of the hybrid.
Direct democracy, used through the initiative process in California, is no
anomaly. Twenty-six other states using various forms of referendum and
the initiative continue to utilize some form of direct democracy. 9' The
basic rationale for providing a direct democratic process is the
"recognition that our representative democracy is often too remote from
the people."9 Further, by giving the people direct access to the laws that
govern them, the threat of abuse by a distant legislature is thereby
reduced.93
But giving the power directly to the people is essentially a creation
of 20th Century politics. It's no secret that the framers of the Federal
Constitution were wary of giving too much power directly to the people,
as the legislative branch of the federal government was set up as a
representative body, and remains so today.94
A number of factors eventually lead to the rise of direct democracy
in the United States. For example, the progressive movements of the late
I 9 th and early 20th Century, the urbanization of American cities,
increasing influence of large businesses, and the changing "principles of
political equality and individual liberty" which "were at risk of being
violated by the growth of political machines and business trusts" all
threatened the historical virtues of American politics. 9 Out of the early
20th Century environment emerged a call to modify the structure of
federal, state and local governments to make them more directly
o
9 . Hybrid Democracy is defined as being "[n]either wholly representative nor wholly direct, but
rather a complex combination of both at the local and state levels, which in turn influences national
politics." Elizabeth Garrett, Hybrid Democracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1096, 1097 (2005); see also
Ethan J. Leib, Can Direct Democracy Be Made Deliberative?54 BUFF. L. REV 903, 906 (2o06).
9i. Leib, supra note 90, at 904.
92. Id. at 905.
93. Id. ("Legislators routinely have perverse incentives in their law-making activities and they are
notoriously constrained by the need to finance their campaigns and pander to the wealthy and
powerful. Direct democracy can serve as a check upon them.").
94. RICH BRAUNSTEIN, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM VOTING: GOVERNING THROUGH DIRECT
DEMOCRACY IN THE US 23 (Eric Rise ed., 2004) ("The progressive conception of democracy would
differ from the founding fathers' views by including an explicit deference to majority rule.").
95. Id. at 17-18.
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accountable to the will of the majority and
96 to reduce the control of
political processes by special interest groups.
Rising out of the progressive movement, by 1911 California created
a system of referendum and initiative voting.' Following the lead of Los
Angeles, Pasadena, San Diego, San Bernardino, Fresno, Sacramento and
Vallejo, who had all locally codified the initiative and referendum by
I907, 8 the "amendment package was intended to substantially inhibit the
domination of special interests active in the state's governing process. '
B.

PITFALLS

A variety of problems with the direct democratic process have been
documented."° "[S]tatutes put to the general population for
consideration are routinely drafted in ways that citizens cannot
understand -sometimes
benignly,
sometimes
subversively.'.'
Additionally, it has been noted that popular citizen deliberation is not
well suited to solve complex tax law problems.' 2 This may stem from
other issues at the heart of the direct democratic debate such as voter
ignorance," but it gives weight to the critics' arguments that the
Proposition is, indeed, abusive of the direct democratic process.' 4
Ironically, direct democracy is criticized as being "susceptible to having
those with access to substantial amounts of money controlling the terms
of the debate," thus reducing policy discussions to sound bites that are
often misleading.'" Here, however, it was those with large incomes that
were targeted to fund new mental health programs. The fact that those
with access to money usually control the content of the debate may be
misleading, however. The special interest groups raised significantly
more money than the opposition groups did while campaigning, which
shows that it's not necessarily those with significant incomes who control
the discussion, but those who raise the most money for one side of the

96. Id. at 19.
97. Id. at 30. ("The passage of the reform amendments, including the institution of initiative and
referendum voting, women's suffrage, creation of an independent railroad commission, codification of
employer's liability, reorganization of the judiciary and regulation of public utility companies made the
governmental process in California more responsive to citizen preferences."). See generally THOMAS
GOEBEL, DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 189o-I940: A GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE (2OO2).

98. BRAUNSTEIN, supra note 94, at 28.

99. Id. at 30.
loo. There are other pitfalls and criticisms, but these were most relevant to the discussion here.
tot. Leib, supra note 90, at 908 ("[T]hey are also often drawn to confuse voters into voting
incorrectly-in a manner at odds with their preferences."). This confusion can lead to the ratification
of ballot measures that were not actually favored by the majority of voters. Id. at 909.
102. Id. at 913.

103. Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence Through
Heuristic Cues and DisclosurePlus, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1142-43 (2003).
104.

Uhler, supra note 3.

105. Leib supra note 90, at 906-07.
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issue and spend that money for or against the issue who end up
controlling the debate. Finally, and perhaps most cynically, direct
democracy has been criticized as lousy lawmaking in which deliberation
is "'replaced by bumper-sticker logic and thirty-second television sound
bites....."
While failing to represent the entire spectrum of the criticisms of the
current direct democracy system, the criticisms do shed light on how the
direct democratic process can be adversely influenced and why imposing
targeted taxes on small groups may be dangerous. There is no way to
prove that Proposition 63 suffered from the problems listed above, but
the initiative process is flawed and subject to abuse when the
combination of complex tax laws, policy matters, and sympathetic
interest groups are placed up against a small, rich group of citizens who
the majority of voters don't feel bad taxing at higher, targeted rates.
IV. TAX POLICY AND PROPOSITION 63
"You can say anything about what constitutes a fair tax system, but
that doesn't make it true.""'° The most common complaint pontificated
about taxes is that "they are too high.""' This attitude reflects "simple
self-interest; no one likes to pay taxes, just as no one enjoys paying utility
bills."'" The dissatisfaction with the tax system has been noted to arise
from "philosophical differences" about the appropriate role of
government in society or from "fears that the government is wasting
money .... Other complaints such as the complexity, difficulty of
enforceability, harmful effects on the economy, and unfairness.. are
common worries and were shared by the opponents of Proposition 63.12

io6. Kang, supra note 103, at 1142 (quoting Catherine A. Rogers & David L. Faigman, "And to the
Republic for which It Stands": Guaranteeinga Republican Form of Government, 23 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q., 1057, lO64 (1996)). Kang goes onto explain his view of the critics complaints:
Many critics of direct democracy have thus concluded that citizens are too uninformed and
incompetent to decide questions of public policy directly. Here the critics are wrong. Voters
can be perfectly competent, just not in the way that many commentators would like them to
be. Critics cringe when they see direct democracy in practice because they cling to an overly
idealistic model of how model citizen-legislators should think about politics. In their view,
people ought to gather all relevant information, thoughtfully consider relevant facts and
arguments, and deliberate until they reach an inclusive consensus. However, people
generally do not have the time to do all this, and even if they did have the time and energy,
they reasonably decline to spend so much time thinking about politics. Voters, quite simply,
choose rationally to be ignorant about politics. Despite their rational ignorance, voters can
still make competent political choices.
Id. at 1143.
107. JOEL SLEMROAD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZENS GUIDE TO THE GREAT DEBATE
OVER TAX REFORM 53 (3rd ed. 2000).
lo8. Id. at I.
lO9. Id.
s1o. Id. at 2.
1I1. Id.
112. See CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 54, at 36-37.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vo1. 59:195

Historically, some tax policy scholars believed that the affluent
should pay more taxes than everyone else." 3 Additionally, the
fundamental criteria for judging a tax system have been fairness and the
promotion of economic prosperity."4 For some, a "fair" tax system means
maintaining graduated rates and perhaps increasing the burden on those
with high incomes."5 However, this is dismissed by others, who see this as
"soaking the rich" or "class warfare," and would prefer a less progressive
system."' Not surprisingly, people's views about whether the tax system
is fair are strongly influenced by how hard the tax system hits their own
family.'
Acknowledging that questions regarding tax policy are naturally
controversial and difficult to resolve," 8 it is appropriate that not all
California voters reached the same conclusion regarding Proposition 63.
While most voters agreed that treating mental illness should be a priority
of the state, others viewed the Proposition as an unnecessary and abusive
means to that end."9 The most common opposing position was that if the
mental health programs are as valuable to California citizens as the
proponents of Proposition 63 claim, then the programs should already
have priority on existing revenues, and should not have to be funded by
higher, targeted taxes since California is already considered a "high tax
°
state."' O
Considering the history of the mental health system in California''
this presents a difficult situation for the voters of California. On one
hand, the mental health community was promised programs and funding
for forty years, and the State has finally provided the funding to a worthy
interest group. On the other hand, it goes against democratic values of
fairness to target and burden a minority of the citizens to fund programs
for the entire state. Imposing taxes by creating an improper funding
system seems irrational and abusive'22 regardless of whether or not the
underlying tax policy might be historically acceptable.
The Proposition 63 discussion echoes classic sentiments of tax
debates: the proponents espouse the long term reduction in state

113. SLEMROAD & BAKIJA, supra note 107, at 50 (noting that this "struck many as a first principle of
fair taxation").
114. Id. at 133. It should also be noted that simplicity and the ease of enforceability are key
ingredients to sound tax policy. Id.
11i5. Id. at 5-6.

116. Id. at 6.
117. Id.
I.8. Id. at 2.
119. Uhler, supra note 3.
120. Mesfin, supra note 73.
121. See supra Part I.
122. See SLEMROAD & BAKUA, supra note lO7.
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spending and other state-wide benefits, 23' while the opponents argue that
this will drive out the wealthy leaving the programs without funding and
the mental health community in a vulnerable state.'24 Accordingly, the
interaction of issues such as the personal tax burdens, tax equity,
governmental inefficiency, and distribution of tax revenues'25 collectively
and inevitably divide the voting populace and make agreeing over new
taxes impossible, as illustrated by the Proposition.
V.

FULL CIRCLE

A. A PARADOX OF SOUND PUBLIC POLICY AND MISGUIDED TAX POLICY
Skepticism should begin to brew in voters' minds anytime the drafter
and main supporter of an initiative recognizes that his/her initiative
presents blatant problems. Here, Democratic Assemblyman Darrell
Steinberg, the drafter and main supporter of Proposition 63, stated that
Proposition 63's funding apparatus "is not the way to fund
government." Additionally, supporters of the Proposition recognized
that they "[did] not like ballot budgeting," and despite concerns "about
the imposition of a targeted tax that does not have a logical correlation
between revenue source and purpose" supported and successfully passed
the Proposition.'27 Reservations regarding the funding were outweighed
by the recognition of the severe consequences of an unwillingness to
confront the problem of funding mental health service programs in
California. 1, 8 After a promising showing from the pilot projects' 9 where
participants had a "56% reduction in hospital stays, a 72% reduction in
jail stays and a 65% increase in full time jobs," the problems with the
Proposition were considered necessary sacrifices for the long term good
of the state.'30 While sources offered varying statistics, the pilot programs
did show at least a 70% reduction in jail days by sending mentally ill
offenders to counseling, and prescribing medications and hospital care."'
There are a variety of reasons why voters choose to take a side on an
initiative, but the problems of ballot issue confusion, a lack of basic facts
123.
124.

See LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION, supra note 35, at ii-iii.
See CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 54, at 37.

125. MARK

BALDASSARE,

A

CALIFORNIA STATE OF MIND: THE CONFLICTED VOTER IN A CHANGING

45 (2002).
126. Editorial, Why Prop. 63 Is Essential,S.F. CHRON., Sept. 27. 2004, at B6.

WORLD

127.

Id.

Id.
See LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION, supra note 36, at 8o; Assem. B. 2034, 2000 Leg., 1999-2000
Sess. § i(a) (5).
130. See Editorial, supra note 126.
131. Catherine Saillant, This Movie Star's Life Is One of Anguish, Addiction: 'A Revolving Door'
Is About a Mentally Ill Ventura Man Whose Family Tries to Help Him, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 2o, 2007, at B6.
Note that what constitutes and how exactly to determine when someone is "spiraling out of control" is
another problem left to the medical profession's own determination. Id.
128.

129.

212
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about ballot measures, and an ability to be "unduly influenced by
superficial advertising" should be factored in when determining whether
the initiative process is being used to unfairly target particular groups of
citizens.'32 Scholars have noted that citizens are too uninformed to decide
questions of public policy directly.'33 Voters "frequently do not
understand the details of the policies they are voting on. Consequently,
policy making through the initiative process has become less predictable.
Along with a distrust of government by voters, this unpredictability
can
'' 34
be added to the list of policy challenges facing the states.
Voters possess the mental capacity to understand and comprehend
ballot issues, but they often do not have the time, "choose rationally to
be ignorant about politics," or think that ballots are too complicated and
confusing.'35 Confusion can be attributed to a number of factors including
confusing ballot language and large numbers of initiatives on the
ballots. 3 Other voters believe that they are not receiving enough
information to decide how to vote on initiatives."'
What helps voters and simplifies the vote choice are "'heuristic cues'
that summarize relevant decision making criteria into easily understood
choices.", 8 When there is voter confusion some of it may be attributed to
a "scarcity in issue elections of these familiar heuristic cues that voters
use to make difficult decisions."'39 The solution, therefore, is to provide
adequate sources of identifiable and understandable information for
voters along with the appropriate heuristic cues, to ensure voters
understand the impact and ramifications of their votes. This will not only
help to reduce voter confusion but may help restore critics' confidence in
the direct democratic process. Improving the direct democratic system
may be an option: roughly 8o% of Californians surveyed supported "a
review system that would address problems with ballot language for
proposed initiatives, and 90% supported a review that would raise
constitutional or legal question before initiatives are placed on the
ballot.""'4
While the debate over the integrity of direct democracy will
continue, the voters of California have spoken. The need to provide
mental health funding, programs, and long term economic benefits
outweighed the problems of the Proposition. The fear of all anti-tax
132. Kang, supra note 103, at 1143.
133. Id. at I142.
134. PuB. POL'Y INST. OF CAL., THE CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE PROCESS-How DEMOCRATIC IS IT? 5
(2000), availableat http://www.cainitiative.org/pdf/lnitiativeHandoutCmmnwlthOP.pdf.
135. Kang, supra note io3, at 1142, 1144, 1149.
136. PUB. POL'Y INST. OF CAL., supra note 134, at 2.
137. Id. at 5.
138. Kang, supra note 1o3, at 1149.
139. Id.
140. PUB. POL'Y INST. OF CAL., supra note 134, at 2-3.
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groups throughout the state was that initiative funding through targeted
taxes would spread, and special interest groups would target other tax
brackets to fund their initiatives. So would special interest groups run
with the targeted tax idea? It would only take one year to find out, but
the voters of California would respond in a surprising and significant
way.
B.

RUNNING WITH TARGETED TAXES: PROPOSITION 82

The fears stemming from creating tax systems targeted at a minority
of the population through the direct democratic system are legitimate,
and the fear of further targeted taxes is not mere speculation. Riding on
the coattails of Proposition 63 was California's Proposition 82.' 4'
Proposition 82 was proposed by movie producer Rob Reiner and was on
'
the ballot of California voters in the primary election on June 6, 2006. 42
The Proposition was targeted to raise the income tax levels of the richest
Californians again and was estimated to generate about $2.4 billion
annually to pay for half day, voluntary preschool programs around the
state.' 43 The proposition would have raised income tax by 1.7% for
individuals who earn more than four hundred thousand dollars annually
and couples who earn more than eight hundred thousand annually.'"
Supporters of Proposition 82 said that this would put California in the
forefront of a growing national movement to provide publicly supported
4
preschools, as the schools could begin to use the funds by 2010. 1
But the proposition was struck down by 6o% of the voters. 46 The
arguments for and against the Proposition echoed those leading up to the
vote on Proposition 63. For example, opponents were strongly opposed
not to the idea of funding preschools, but to how Proposition 82 would
finance the new preschool system.'47 Opponents argued that the tax
increases would drive out wealthy people from the state, stop businesses
from investing in California, create a new bureaucracy limiting local
control and making it harder for parents to be involved, cause closures of
141. See generally

CALIFORNIA

SECRETARY

OF

STATE,

OFFICIAL

VOTER

INFORMATION

PROPOSITION 82: PRESCHOOL EDUCATION TAX ON INCOMES OVER $400,000 FOR INDIVIDUALS,
COUPLES

14

(2OO6),

available

at

GUIDE:

$800,000

FOR

http:l/www.sos.ca.gov/electionslvigo6/vig-pdf/

oiA..entire-juneo6_vigsmaller.pdf.
142. See Institute of Governmental Studies, Proposition 82:Universal Preschool, June 2006, http://
www.igs.berkeley.edu/library/htUniversalPreschool.html.
143. Mark Martin, Proposition 82-Voters Split on Pioneering Preschool Plan: Ballot Measure
CHRON., May 30, 2006, at A2I.

Would Expand Programsby Taxing Richest, S.F.
144. Id.

145. Janine DeFao, Measure to Tax Rich for Preschoolfor All Headingfor Defeat, S.F.

CHRON.,

June 7, 2006, at AI.
146. See CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, STATEMENT OF THE VOTE 136 (2006), availableat http://
www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sOv/2oo6_primary/ssov/props-summary.pdf; Institute of Governmental
Studies, supra note 142.
147. Institute of Governmental Studies, supra note 142.
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existing preschools, deprive regular education funds for K-12 schools,
and most importantly, "unfair[ly] single out one segment of the
population for tax increases."'' 8
This indicates that California's voters may not be as eager to target
higher earning citizens with higher taxes as was thought after Proposition
63. Additionally, this illustrates that when more citizens are drawn into a
new targeted tax bracket that more voters will turn out to strike down
the initiative.'49 There was a 13.8% swing in the vote when the targeted
tax was dropped by $6oo,ooo. While Proposition 82 was struck down, it
must also be noted that this does not indicate that Californians don't
want to expand preschool, but indicates that the state will have to go
about doing it "in a more cost effective manner.""5So where do we go
from here and what are the possible solutions to making Proposition 63
work in a fair and effective way?
VI.

A.

PROPOSALS FOR FAIR AND EFFECTIVE CHANGE

63?
One solution to Proposition 63's problmes is a complete repeal of
Proposition. California State Senator Denis Hollingsworth proposed a
repeal on January i i, 2007, and the proposal has yet to be voted on.
What is known as California Senate Bill 575' will have a variety of
significant tax implications if passed by the California Senate. In terms of
direct affect on Proposition 63, Senate Bill 57 proposes to repeal sections
17043 and 19602.5 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code, the
sections that Proposition 63 created to fund its goals.'52
Repealing Proposition 63 would solve all of the critics' tax policy and
direct democracy problems, but neither side would be satisfied. As noted
previously, many of the critics of Proposition 63 weren't opposed to new
funding for mental health programs; they had reservations with the
method of funding. Additionally, after reviewing the history of the
mental health system in California, ' repealing Proposition 63 would
have dire effects on the struggling mental health community, and would
stifle the long term economic benefits promised by the Proposition's
proponents, through reduced prison visits, reduced medical costs, and
REPEALING PROPOSITION

148. Id.
149. The idea that raising taxes gets voters to turn out and enflames certain areas of the

population, is a rather poignant example of the number of voters who do see the problems associated
with targeted taxes.
150. Janine DeFao, PreschoolSupporters Aren't Giving Up On Their Quest, S.F. CHRON., June 8,
2006, at At6.
151. See S.B. 57, 2007-08, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007).
152. Id.; see also 2004 Cal. Legis. Serv. page nos. A-49 to-5o §§ 4, 8.
153. See discussion supra Part I.
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treatment of the causes rather than the results of mental illness.'54
Additionally, legislatively repealing an initiative approved by the
majority of the citizens in California undermines confidence in the
voters' will, and damages the integrity of the initiative process.
Accordingly, a complete repeal of the Proposition is not an ideal
solution.
B.

AMENDING THE PROPOSITION

i. Revenue Goals & Rewarding Proven Programs
The other alternative is to amend the Proposition to alleviate its
abusive characteristics while providing adequate funds necessary to
achieve the long-term goals of the Proposition. Changing the funding
structure would not be easy, and without funding the entire Proposition
would be in jeopardy. Inadequate funding is one of the problems that has
stymied the mental health program for forty years.
What legislators could propose-and what the Proposition failed to
adequately assess-is the exact financial need of the mental health
community per county, per year. The problem with raising funds only for
new programs is that there is no way to precisely determine what the
financial burden of the new programs will be since each county will draft
their own proposals based on their own assessment of need and ability.
Currently, a number of counties have submitted three-year proposals for
expanding new mental health programs.
The solution, therefore, is to use the financial estimates of the
counties, and focus on what the counties will be able to accommodate,
and what their own assessment of future needs will be. A funding
structure based on an accurate accounting of financial need will pave the
way for a fair and accurate restructuring of the funding apparatus. By
creating an economic benchmark of need, a funding structure can be
targeted and focused more effectively, rather than the current tax
structure, which has succeeded in raising a significant amount of revenue,
but has failed to correlate accessibility, need, and effective
implementation.
A target number and a more effective funding apparatus could be
created through the following changes: use the county reports to create a
target number for revenue goals, allocate reserves for additional costs,
and allow the funds raised to be used on existing programs that have a
proven track record. This would solve the problem of the two-tiered
system which the Proposition created.
Also, expanding existing, successful programs and getting rid of old,
failing programs is more effective than only using new funds on new

154- See 2004 Cal. Legis. Serv. page no. A-47 § 3(b).
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programs. The Proposition requires that current funding be maintained,
but does not differentiate between the quality, success or effectiveness of
the pre-Proposition 63 programs. The best solution is to expand the good
programs with funds from Proposition 63, and create new programs to
replace those that have become financial liabilities or unsuccessful.
Adding new programs as the county resources and the Department of
Mental Health can effectively provide support would fulfill the
expansion goals of the Proposition while putting to use effective
programs which are currently up and running. The inadequacy of the
current structure' 5 only enflames the critics and proves them right. The
stakes are too high to have this Proposition repealed due to inefficient
and short-sighted financial planning.
2. Amending the Tax Structure
Whatever the new tax structure might be, it is certainly not a fair or
economically sound tax policy to raise billions of dollars through a
targeted tax and then leave the money partially distributed due to
inadequate resources to distribute and adequately put the money to
use.' , 6 In terms of creating a fair system to replace the current targeted
tax, once revenue goals are established, the tax experts can accurately
assess the best funding apparatus to raise the target amount.
One option is to use more of the general fund for mental health
purposes. Coupled with the goals of Proposition 63 more funds can be
utilized for mental health services without targeted taxes at all. Since
California spends billions each year on treating the aftermath of mental
illness, there is a significant amount of money that can be reallocated to
these new, preventative programs thereby avoiding any tax increase.
Utilizing the funds being spent in a more educated and effective manner,
would allow the $4 billion currently spent annually to circumvent a tax
hike and provide the long term savings that the proponents of
Proposition 63 have sought. One of the problems with providing funding
from the general fund, however, is that the mental health community
historically faired poorly in the political process, and garnering support
by competing with the other interest groups for general funds has been
unsuccessful-that is why Proposition 63 exists. Regardless, since most
Californians support increased funding for mental health care, an
increase from the general fund seems like the most equitable and fair
solution to the problem, albeit not the most politically viable.
Another approach is to increase income tax marginally across all
income levels, and allocate new funds toward Proposition 63 programs.
This would make the tax both correlative and fair because the programs
155. See Meyer, supra note Io; Carrett, supra note 90.
156. Greg Lucas, New Funds Leave Old ProgramsStruggling Despite Prop 63, Counties Cut Core
Mental Health Aid, S.F. CHRON., July 31, 2006, at Bi.
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that the funds are used toward can be accessed by every Californian and
will be paid for by all Californians. The new funds can then be
earmarked for the implementation of the Proposition, and the problem
of targeting small groups of citizens based on their income would be
circumvented. The problem here is one that the drafters may have
contemplated, as the Proposition was structured because it was the only
"sellable" way of getting the mental health community the funds that
they needed.'57 Accordingly, Californians may be willing to pay for
mental health care, just not with their own money.
Other funding structures are possible such as increased sales taxes,
increased vehicle registration fees, or increased property taxes-all of
which have been used in the past to fund initiatives, but none of which
seem obviously correlative to mental health care. The tax solutions are
undoubtedly difficult, but the only three viable options-(I) repealing
the targeted tax and reallocating the billions currently being spent on
Proposition 63 focused programs; (2) increasing mental health care
spending from the general fund; and (3) marginally raising income taxes
across all income levels and earmarking those fund for Proposition 63
purposes-are not perfect in any manner. They all fail to address one or
more problems at the heart of the mental health care debate. The first
and second would be the easiest to implement, and would not raise any
taxes at all, but are not viable because they have failed for the past forty
years to succeed, and have resulted in Proposition 63's enactment. Thus,
the third, which would increase rates minimally across income tax levels
(based on targeted funding needs), would not only be a more equitable
system than the targeted tax created by Proposition 63, but would make
the citizens of California, across all income levels, accountable for the
increased mental health care that they desire. If Californians want to
provide care, and the only way to provide this care is by increasing taxes,
then all Californians should pay, not simply those who the majority of
voters have targeted to pay.
CONCLUSION

The need to fund, educate, and prevent further mental illness in
California is a priority of the State. However, California currently spends
$4 billion each year coping with the effects of the problems rather than
treating and preventing the cause.': "The need for improved treatment
for [mental health patients] is vast ....[Ailmost half of the U.S.
population will experience a mental disorder such as serious anxiety or
depression."'5 9 As of early 2007, Rhode Island Representative Patrick
157. Editorial, supra note 126.

158. Colliver. supra note 4 ("[California] spends about $4 billion annually on services, most of any
state."). See generally LITTLE HooVER COMMISSIo , supra note 35.
159. Suzanne Bohan, Mental Health Meeting Focuses on Racial Outreach, INSIDE THE BAY AREA,
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Kennedy and Republican Senator Pete Domenici were pushing a Federal
House Bill to give all U.S. citizens access to mental health care through
insurance companies in an attempt to end the years of discrimination
against the mentally ill.' 60 Additionally, in the wake of the Virginia Tech
tragedy, California law makers and mental health advocates announced
in June of 2007, a Proposition 63-funded "four-year $6o million student
mental health initiative to provide peer to peer support, training and
awareness in K-T2 classrooms and higher education institutions."'
The
6
pendulum has shifted and the potential savings are real. ,
However, there is a dire need to find an appropriate balance and to
find a fiscally responsible structure for funding the programs. The people
opposing Proposition 63 along with the Proposition's drafters both
recognized the problems with the targeted tax system. Sacrificing the
integrity of the direct democratic system does nothing for the long-term
economic or political integrity of the state and an attempt to amend
rather than appeal the Proposition is the appropriate course.
Making an intelligent judgment about tax policy requires "seeing
through the self-serving arguments to a clear understanding of the issues
involved.,,6 Additionally, the same analyst noted "decisions must be
made without the luxury of having definitive answers to many of the
critical questions."' 6' Some issues,
such as what is "fair" ultimately rely
6
on individual value judgments.' ,
One conclusion from Proposition 63 is that when a tax is targeted at
a small, rich portion of the population, and when there is support by
sympathetic interest groups, the majority of the voters in California think
that raising taxes is worthwhile. However, as, Proposition 82 shows,
Californians draw the line on targeted taxes somewhere.
It is highly likely that the failure of Proposition 82 will not end the
attempts to fund initiatives through targeted taxes. Also, it is too
speculative to assume or to know what the tipping point might be; but it
probably lies somewhere between Proposition 63 at the high end and
Proposition 82 at the low end. Even more worrisome to the anti-tax
community is if the "highly mobile millionaires" are targeted more often,
they may begin to move out of California. In 2ooo and 2001 thousands of
Nov. II,2oo6,available at http://www.insidebayarea.com/search/ci-4643287?IADID=Search.
i6o. Robert Pear, Proposalsfor Mental Health Parity Pit a Father's PragmatismAgainst a Son's

Passion,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2007, at AII.
161. Judy Lin, Expansion Proposed for Student Mental-Health Programs, SACRAMENTO BEE, June
13, 2007, http://www.sacbee.com/i I I/v-print/story/220773.html.
162. CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note to, at 35 ("State and national studies have
indicated that mental health programs similar to some of those expanded by this measure generate
significant savings to state and local governments that partly offset their additional costs.").
163. SLEMROAD & BAKIJA, supra note 107, at 15.
164. Id.
I65. Id.
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high earners "vanished" from California removing $6 billion from
California tax revenues.' 66 A similar emigration would have a larger
adverse economic affect than any targeted tax, and would likely leave the
rest of the California population to foot the bill for the new Proposition
63 programs. ' 67 As noted earlier, the taxpayers targeted by ProVosition 63
provide 25% of the personal income revenue for the state,' and are a
portion of our population that we cannot afford to lose. While
Proposition 63 has a number of problems, the appropriate solution is to
allow the debate to progress, trust the democratic process, and value the
will of the majority while protecting minority groups, rich or poor, from
tyranny of the majority.
As of 2007, the analysis on Proposition 63's impact was
inconclusive.' 69 Whether or not it has or will succeed in accomplishing its
goals is unknown. The Proposition's progress is being monitored closely,
however. The Petris Center on Health Care Markets and Consumer
Welfare, a UC Berkeley research center, plans to study the effectiveness
of the °Proposition and is likely to have some answers within three
years. 17

Regardless of the outcome, providing services and preventative care
for the mentally ill should remain a priority of the state, and the
development of a fair, correlative, and fiscally responsible solution to the
evolving problem is both viable and critical to upholding the integrity of
the state of California.

166. Jill Stewart, Democracy vs. Dumb-ocracy, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 29, 2004, at B9.
167. Id.
68. See Meyer, supra note io.
169. Id.
170. Id. The Petris Center received a grant from the California HealthCare Foundation "to study
the implementation and effects" of the Mental Health Services Act, and is currently conducting
research on the impact of Proposition 63. Id.
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